Extra Story The Rise and Fall of Changxin Bank

  Fanwai: The Rise and Fall of Changxin Bank

  【Off-topic】:

   Today, due to work, a dinner party and a fierce battle were inevitable, and the middle-aged Ultraman temporarily lost his light.

  Think about it, take advantage of the noon break, sort out the information of Changxin Bank, and let everyone know a little more about the plot before and after. If you don’t update the text, at least you have something to look at.

  【Text】:

   1. Establishment: a half-national bank serving the needs of national policies

  After the war, in order to recover the economy, Japan first started to rescue financial institutions.

   Of course, in this process, the United States also has various considerations, and Japan’s financial structure is still in turmoil. The chaebol has transformed into a consortium, and the government needs a financial institution that can actively respond to the needs of the cabinet and allocate resources through financial means to quickly rebuild important industries.

  In 1952, Isato Ikeda, then Minister of the Ministry of Finance, convened a Financial Policy Committee, planning to use banks as the main source of financing and to divide different financial functions into different institutions. Brokerage firms specialize in the stock market, city banks serve consumers and provide short-term loans to large corporations (consortium banks), trust banks specialize in asset management, and regional banks serve small clients.

   In that year, the “Long-Term Credit Bank Law” was passed, creating a whole new type of bank—long-term credit bank. Ikeda believes that “long-term credit banks” should raise their own bonds by issuing bonds and provide long-term loans to specific industries such as steel, shipbuilding, and electricity.

In this context, the pre-war semi-official bank, the Bank of Japan, was divided into two parts, and half of them became ordinary commercial banks, still using the name of the Bank of Japan (later merged with the First Bank in 1971, which is the book The First Advice Bank). The other half was restructured into a long-term credit bank, and Dajang Province provided 50% of the capital to Changyin by subscribing for preferred shares. In the three years after its establishment, it subscribed for 40% of all the financial bonds issued by Changyin. .

   In other words, Changxin Bank was originally a semi-official bank, and after 1952, it stripped off those unofficial businesses, and the remaining Changxin Bank was almost his own son. Of course, Changxin Bank has to be obedient and operate in the form of long-term credit loans according to the government’s policy needs.

In terms of loan investment, as a commercial bank with policy attributes, at the beginning of its establishment, Changyin mainly focused on industries that were in line with “national interests” and obeyed the government’s industrial policies, such as shipbuilding, electricity, steel, and coal in the early days of World War II. industry, and later industrial production industries such as automobile manufacturing.

  In Changyin’s view, only companies with government support and in line with government policy orientation and their affiliates can survive in Japan for a long time. Therefore, in the actual credit business, Changyin often does not use the financial statements of the company as the basis for judgment, but more considers the background and social relations of the company.

   In this book, Maehara Mina, who was born in Changyin, was asked by his boss to serve Gou Dalang well, which is actually a manifestation of Changshin Bank’s focus on building relationships. Of course, other banks are doing the same.

   2. Development, difficulties and hidden dangers

  With the take-off of Japan’s economy, Changyin is also growing. In the early 1960s, Changyin’s business developed rapidly. In 1963, Changyin provided hundreds of billions of yen of funds for domestic manufacturing, and the lenders included Toyota, Toray Group, Kawasaki Steel, Tokyo Electric Power, and Bridgestone. Industry giants such as tires and Toshiba, and Changyin also helped these companies expand overseas during the same period.

  In the mid-to-late 1960s, after securing a loan from Toyota to the Export-Import Bank of the United States, Changyin realized the importance of overseas opportunities, so it sent staff to learn foreign languages ​​and went to overseas banks for training. In the future, the “internationalists” in the management of Changyin, such as Katsunobu Ono and Hirao Hiroshi, came to the fore after receiving overseas training during this period.

   With the slowdown of the economy in the 1970s and the development of the direct financing market, there was less and less demand for loans through Changyin, threatening the long-term development of Changyin. Therefore, the “internationalists” including Ono Mu Kexin began to advocate the reform of Changyin, and Ono Mukeshin’s proposal of transforming the company into an investment bank was also recognized by the senior executives of Changyin.

   However, as a policy-based bank, due to the direct financial supervision of the Ministry of Finance, although banks are still not allowed to intervene in bond and stock business in Japan, they can set up branches overseas and participate in bond underwriting in overseas markets. Changyin therefore plans to set up an “investment banking group” to develop new businesses such as bond trading, investment advisory and series products.

In this book, Tao Zhiming, Stevenson and others plan to attack Changxin Bank from the outside and inside, which means to attack the overseas operations of the Changxin Bank investment banking group from the outside, compressing their income and aggravating their crisis. .

  Since 1985, with the continuous accumulation of Japan’s real estate and stock bubbles, the efforts of Changxin Bank’s reformers have been diluted, and Changxin Bank’s main energy is still on the domestic market. The easy profits brought by the bubble economy make Long Yin indulge in the game of the bubble economy, especially real estate has become the new favorite of Long Yin.

  1985-1988, Changyin’s assets increased from 18.4 trillion yen to 22.6 trillion yen, a considerable part of which came from a substantial increase in real estate loans. In 1990, the market value of Long Yin was 24.8 billion US dollars, ranking 9th in the world.

   The madness of real estate has made Changyin’s original transformation to an investment bank less urgent. Compared with the restrictions and meager profits of investment banks, real estate loans are more profitable.

  In this book, the middle management of Changxin first encouraged Kyumina Maehara to contact Tao Zhiming, just for the real estate loan that Takeda made the land. Later, their loan to Yoshiaki Tsui was also mentioned.

   also mentioned a company, Takahashi Ye of EIE.

  EIE (ElectronicsandIndustrialEnterprise) was established in 1947. After Takahashi took over the company, it became a trading company specializing in the import of electronic products. In the 1980s, Takahashi announced that he would transform EIE into a real estate group. EIE companies bought land and built hotels around in the bubble phase, gobbling up many of the world’s assets.

  EIE’s real estate business started with the purchase of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Saipan, and then in 1987 it bought a 30% stake in Emgrand Hotel Management Group. Takahashi made a lot of money and bought the hotel he liked directly. A cattle ranch in Hawaii was valued at $20 million, and Takahashi wanted to build a hotel, so he bought it for $150 million. At the height of the bubble in 1989, EIE moved into expensive new office buildings, and the company owned several private jets during the same period.

   The real estate group EIE, which has a huge demand for funds, and Takahashi Takahashi, who has a certain position in the upper class in Japan, have won the favor of banks. In the project of the Hyatt Regency Hotel on Saipan, Changyin and HSBC have lent 30 billion yen. Changyin’s loan to EIE has almost reached the point of unconditional approval. In 1990, EIE’s total borrowings reached 700 billion yen, and it became one of the 10 largest customers of Changyin.

  Changshin Bank was born to help the government quickly mobilize resources to specific industries, but it lost this role after the Japanese economy developed to a certain stage, and the window guidance of the Bank of Japan was sufficient for deployment.

   In this process, Changxin Bank is actually confused in which direction to develop. Then Japan took off and the bubble economy came, and Changxin Bank fell into the pit of real estate loans and financial investment.

  Three, the crash process

   Falling stock and real estate prices also dealt a double whammy to Long Silver.

  Real estate companies such as EIE were hit hard after the economic bubble burst. In the pre-bubble burst, Changyin believed that real estate and stock prices were only temporarily falling, so it continued to lend more to EIE. In 1993, Changyin discovered that the problems of EIE were extremely serious, announced to cut off all contact with EIE, and admitted that half of the 190 billion yen that had been loaned successively could not be recovered. In 1995, the scandal of EIE’s bribery of the government was brought to Congress. At the congressional hearing, Osamu Takahashi revealed that Changyin had funded the rescue of two credit unions. The act of providing loans.

   At the end of March 1995, Changyin announced that the total amount of bad debts reached 784 billion yen, and used the annual profit to write off almost half of the bad debts. In the summer of 1996, the Ministry of Finance believed that Changyin’s risky loans were 4 trillion yen, accounting for 25% of the total loans, and one-third of the risky loans could not be repaid.

   Since then, Changxin Bank has been frantically saving itself, but there has been no good way.

   In late June 1998, Changshin Bank announced an alliance with Sumitomo Trust. However, Sumitomo Trust itself has many bad debts, and Sumitomo Trust insists that the merger will only be carried out if the government first removes the bad debts of Changshin Bank and injects public funds to keep Changshin Bank alive. Regrettably, the Congress voted to reject this plan, which required 2 trillion yen.

   In late October 1998, Congress agreed to set up a 60 trillion yen safety fund for the financial system and find a buyer for Changxin Bank. During this period, Changxin Bank was nationalized and managed. At this time, the capital gap of Changxin Bank reached 300 billion yen. When Changxin Bank collapsed, it had 23 trillion yen on its books, two-thirds of which were corporate loans. After nationalization, government management agencies gradually sold off the financial credit assets of Changxin Bank, and transferred 5 trillion yen of non-performing assets to sorting and recycling agencies. In the summer of 1999, Changxin Bank finally had 11 trillion yen of loans left on its books.

  Ribowood Group from the United States actively participated in the bid to take over Changxin Bank. In September 1999, Ruibowood proposed the first business plan: to buy Changxin Bank for 1 billion yen, inject capital of 120 billion yen, and take over all the loans of Changxin Bank. In Japan, the government took out 500 billion yen of reserves and proposed a “cancellation right” plan; another 240 billion yen was injected into Changxin Bank. After negotiations, the Japanese government raised the reserve to 900 billion yen. In 2000, after many negotiations, Ribowood took over Changxin Bank and changed its name to Shinsei Bank, ending the story of Changxin Bank.

   This is the real process of the collapse and reorganization of Changxin Bank. That is to say, the Changxin Bank with a market value of 24.6 billion US dollars and assets of more than 20 trillion at its peak was won by US capital of 121 billion yen, and Japan was also asked to take out 500 billion reserves and inject 240 billion yen into Changxin Bank.

  1210 yen, the yen has appreciated to 199 years, it is only worth 1 billion US dollars.

   In this book, the general development process of Changxin Bank has not changed. Because of Tao Zhiming’s participation, the pit buried in Changxin Bank is more targeted and prepared.

   The Financial Prosecutor’s Office and the Financial Regeneration Committee, which were not established until 1998, were also established ahead of schedule at the end of 1992 because of Tao Zhiming’s disorderly entry.

   Listing the numbers can also allow everyone to have a judgment on the actual value of the funds at that time. After all, this was 30 years ago, and the scale of Tao Zhiming’s capital is really scary, and it is also unexpected for ordinary people.

   This is one of the reasons why he can have firm allies, the strength is there.

  $5 billion is thrown out, and it is understandable how powerful it is at that time and how much misjudgment it will cause others.

   Even Changxin Bank, which has more than 20 trillion yen in assets, will eventually go bankrupt because of only more than 700 billion bad debts.

Under normal circumstances, Tao Zhiming would not have enough funds to make Stevenson and the others feel that they have spent 5 billion yuan, and they have to buy News Agency and Dentsu, and they have to invest in the New Millennium Vision Investment Fund for Hashimoto. Tao Zhiming, who has accumulated political assets in Taro, really has other appetites and so much strength to do other than Changxin Bank.

   Isn’t Tsutsumi Yoshiaki, the richest man of hundreds of billions of dollars, broken because of a real estate project in Osaki New Town?

  OK, the background of Changxin Bank is introduced here.

   Next is the time when the Sanyou Foundation really appears in the sight of ordinary people.

   (end of this chapter)